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COMMENTARY
A Cure for the Plaintiff's Ills?
ANDREW C. MALLOR*
In recent years negligence lawyers have been castigated as the
villains of the malpractice problem.' In 1975, a full page newspaper
advertisement was placed by the medical staff of a county hospital
soliciting public support for legislation abolishing the contingency fee
system, the legal doctrines of informed consent and res ipsa loquitur,
and the availability of punitive damages in malpractice actions.2 Re-
sponsibility for the malpractice crisis was placed on the plaintiffs' bar
and the court system.' In truth, the malpractice problem cannot be
resolved by narrowly focusing on the legal system. The malpractice
problem is complex and far reaching, and easy solutions simply do
not exist.
This article will analyze the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act in-
sofar as it affects the rights and interests of the plaintiff in a malprac-
tice action. Special emphasis will be placed on the effects of the Indi-
*BA. 1971, J.D. 1974, Indiana University; Associate: Applegate and Pratt, Bloom-
ington, Indiana.
I See, e.g., 1 D. LouisELL & H. WLIAss, MlsicAL MALPRAICE 1.03 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as LouisELL & Wnzma~s]; Caswell, A Surgeon's Thoughts on Malpractice,
30 TIm. L.Q. 391 (1957); Hamacher, Toward an Effective Attorney-Physician Relation-
ship, 4 GONZAGA L. Rav. 45 (1968); Oleck, A Cure for Doctor-Lawyer Frictions, 7 CLEv.-
MAIL L. REv. 473 (1958).
2
TDAY, March 9, 1975, reprinted in 2 Tim AssocIAT N or TRIAL LAWYERS OF
A=RaiC, QUALITY MEDICAL CARE-TaE PATIENT'S RIGHT 1081 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as ATLA]. One leading plaintiff's attorney, Barry D. Goldberg of Goldberg and Goldberg,
Chicago, Illinois, has responded to similar complaints against the legal system by suggesting
the following as possible long term solutions to the problem:
1. Stringent controls upon doctors and hospitals to prevent unnecessary surgeries
and improper use of prescription drugs.
2. Stricter policing of the medical profession.
3. Insurance coverage must be made available to qualified doctors at reasonable
rates, and, if necessary, through mandatory reinsurance or assigned risk pro-
grams.
4. Preservation of the contingency fee.
5. Preservation of the doctrine of informed consent and res ipsa loquitur as
well as a liberal and realistic statute of limitations.
6. Eliminate ad damnums publication of prayers and other verdicts.
7. Eliminate the required consent of defendant before settlemenL
Goldberg, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE Introduction
(1975).
3 See, e.g., Stetler, Medical-Legal Relations-The Brighter Side, 2 ViLL. L. REv. 487,
488-89 (1957). The antagonism between the medical and legal professions has been dis-
cussed in many articles. See sources cited note 1 supra.
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ana Medical Malpractice Act in aiding or retarding the plaintiffs' bar
in seeking redress for injuries caused by medical malpractice.
THE ROLE OF PLAINTIFFS' BAR
IN THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act was promulgated with an
emergency clause making the effective date July 1, 1975.' The nature
of the emergency is not articulated in the Act. However, the malprac-
tice problem has generally been defined in terms of the inability of
health care providers to purchase professional liability insurance at
reasonable rates.' The premiums that health care providers must pay
for this insurance have increased significantly, supposedly because of
the drastic rise in the number of malpractice actions filed each year.'
The apparent increase in malpractice litigation was first compre-
hensively studied in 1969 by the Subcommittee on Executive Reorgani-
zation of the United States Senate.7 The introductory statement, au-
thored by Chairman Abraham Ribicoff, is a concise and articulate dis-
cussion of the malpractice problem. Gathering data from lawyers, health
care providers, insurance companies, and the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, the Committee reached several conclusions con-
cerning the malpractice crisis.' The Committee concluded, inter alia,
that the majority of the malpractice claims were justifiable, resulting
from injuries suffered by patients during medical treatment or surgery."
The Committee also found that the plaintiffs' bar adequately screened
4 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1975) [hereinafter referred to as the
Act].
5 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTIVE REORG. or TiE SENATE COmiM. ON GoVT
OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: TIE PATIENT VERSUS TE
PHYSICIAN 12 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]; Bernz-
weig, The Malpractice Problem: The Need for a Perspective, statement to a meeting con-
vened by the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare to discuss the malpractice crisis,
reprinted in ATLA at 61.
'See, e.g., Averbach, Rx for Malpractice, 19 CLEV. ST. L. Rxv. 20, 21 (1970); Winikoff,
Medical-Legal Screening Panels As An Alternative Approach to Malpractice Claims, 13
Wm. & MARY L. REv. 695, 702 (1972); Note, Malpractice Suits: The Increased Cost of
Health Care, 8 TuLsA L.J. 223 (1972).
7 See MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. See also Winikoff, supra note 6, at 695.
8 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at 1-2. See also Winikoff, supra note 6 at 703, 709; Note,
Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141,
1141 n.6 (1975).
9MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at 1. See also, Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat:
A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuxE L.J. 939; Malpractice Cost Driving Doctors
Off, New York Times, Oct. 5, 1974, at 12.
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the majority of claims."0 Nevertheless, the number of claims filed has
risen markedly."
The increased number of claims made for malpractice is certainly
a factor in the. increased cost of professional liability insurance. 2 How-
ever, the majority of these costs do not inure to the injured plaintiff,
nor to the plaintiff's attorney, but rather are costs of defense. 3 As a
general rule, a malpractice action, due to the need to present expert
testimony, will be far more expensive, both to prosecute and to defend,
than most personal injury actions. Furthermore, the malpractice claim
takes longer for resolution than most personal injury claims. 4 Many
physicians, by refusing to cooperate with plaintiffs' attorneys in investi-
gating the claim before it is filed, or by refusing to serve as expert
witnesses in malpractice actions, have actually increased the legal costs
of malpractice litigation and, as a result, the premiums charged by the
insurance industry.' The failure of the medical community to make
available to the plaintiffs' bar the records and data needed to make a
preliminary determination of whether a claim is meritorious has forced
attorneys to file lawsuits in order to obtain discovery.' 6
There have been many proposals for reducing litigation costs. One
proposal is to submit all claims below a specified dollar amount to arbi-
tration.' Another proposal is to institute screening panels to determine
10 The Medical Malpractice Threat, supra note 9, at 947-48.
The malpractice liability system is meant to police the quality of care that patients
receive, and to compensate the victim when care is administered negligently. Different
systems may be judged by how well they reduce the sum of three separate costs: 1) the
cost of the maloccurrence, i.e., the harm; 2) the cost of avoidance; and, 3) the cost of
administration, i.e., the legal cost. See Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for
Medical Maloccurrences, supra note 8, at 1143, in which the writer discusses replacing
the negligence system with strict liability, and the special problems associated with mal-
practice. See also Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 616
(1973).
,1U.S. DEP'T. or HEALT, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S CoM-
MISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CommissioN REPORT].
12 id. at 13; Morris, Medical Reports: Malpractice Crisis-A View of Malpractice in
the 1970s, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 521 (1971). Richard P. Bergen, of the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, American Medical Association, in Protection Against Malpractice Litigation,
101 Acgc. OcoraYNoL 182 (1975) lists the following factors: (1) awards or settle-
ments paid to patients; (2) legal fees for defense; (3) fees for defense expert witnesses;
(4) expenses for investigation; and (5) general administration expenses.
3MEoICAL .PRACTICE at 10.
14 COA ssioN REPoRT at 11. Winikoff, supra note 6, at 700-01.
Is Winikoff, supra note 6, at 700-01.
16 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at 11.
17 1n two Pennsylvania counties, all personal injury actions involving less than $10,000
are submitted to arbitration. See Co ssION REPoRT at 92-94. Arbitration speeds the
handling of claims, saves parties time, promotes informal proceedings, and encourages a
fact-finding procedure without the emotional overtones and adversary nature of a court-
room. Id. at 94. See also id. Appendix, at 214-449. Another suggested proposal is the
19751
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early in the proceeding whether or not the claim is well founded.'8 Any
proposal to lessen the legal costs involved in malpractice actions must
reflect a delicate balance between relieving the competent health care
provider from the pressure of potential malpractice suits and guarantee-
ing the injured patient protection and compensation from acts of negli-
gence and incompetence.' 9 The public interest is best served by that
system which guarantees the availability of professional liability insur-
ance to competent practitioners at reasonable rates and which also guar-
antees that the victims of malpractice will be compensated swiftly and
fairly.2" The Indiana Act introduces several substantive and procedural
changes which will affect both of these interests.
THE MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL
One of the recommendations made by the Ribicoff Report was the
establishment of medical review screening panels. The Indiana Act
contains the country's first legislatively created system of review panels.2'
Hereafter, a condition precedent to the bringing of any malpractice
action will be the submission of the case to a medical review board. The
panel will determine whether there was a failure on the part of the
health care provider to comply with the appropriate standard of care
as charged in the complaint, and whether this conduct was, or was not,
a factor in any injury.22
The plaintiffs' bar would readily welcome the creation of a neutral
and objective medical review panel. As a practical matter, the plaintiff
in a malpractice case will always require expert testimony.23 One of
adoption of a no-fault or strict liability plan. See Note, Comparative Approaches to
Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, supra note 8.
18See MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at 10; Winikoff, supra note 6; Anderson v. Florence,
289 Minn. 497, 181 N.W.2d 873 (1970).
19 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at 13.
20 The patient faces four major problems in his attempt to secure a favorable verdict
against the physician in a medical malpractice action: (1) preparing the case for trial;
(2) obtaining competent expert witnesses; (3) overcoming, especially in less urban areas,
the image of the physician in the community; and (4) financial capacity to endure pro-
longed litigation and delay in obtaining compensation for the injury. The patient must
have medical evidence before trial to competently prepare his case. Winikoff, supra note 6,
at 700.
21 Winikoff, supra note 6, at 713 (listing jurisdictions). Cf. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
519-A (1974) (imposed arbitration).
22 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns Supp. 1975) provides:
No action against a health care provider may be commenced in any court of
this state before the claimant's proposed complaint has been presented to a medical
review panel established pursuant to this chapter [16-9.5-9-1-16-9.5-9-10] and an
opinion is rendered by the panel.
23 See D. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW oF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 130 (1959);
Note, Overcoming the Conspiracy of Silence: Statutory and Common Law Innovations, 45
MINN. L. REv. 1019 (1961); Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony--Oregon Medical-Malprac-
tice Cases, 40 ORE. L. REV. 343, 345 (1961).
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the major complaints of the plaintiffs' bar has been the difficulty in ob-
taining a medical expert who will testify to facts or give opinions in a
malpractice action.2" This reluctance on the part of physicians to testify
against each other is often referred to as the "conspiracy of silence."' 5
This so-called conspiracy has resulted in a great many miscarriages of
justice."' Generally, the reasons given for the existence of the conspiracy
are that doctors feel they will be found negligent where there has been
no malpractice and that jurors are ill-equipped to deal with the intri-
cate problems presented by malpractice litigation. Unfortunately, many
doctors seem to believe that all malpractice cases are meritless and are
the result of either greedy attorneys or greedy patients. It is ironic
that the physician's reluctance to testify has. forced the courts to apply
those legal doctrines which are most reprehensible to the medical pro-
fession in an attempt to make certain that the victim of professional
negligence is compensated."
There have been many extrajudicial plans aimed at eliminating the
conspiracy of silence and providing a mechanism for the equitable and
expeditious settlement of malpractice claims.28 The medical review panel
was designed to serve this function in Indiana.
24 See Note, Medical Malpractice Litigation: Some Suggested Improvements and a Pos-
sible Alternative, 18 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 623, 626 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Malpractice
Litigation]; Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L.
REv. 729, 743 (1970), discussing the impossible burden facing the plaintiff absent an expert
witness. See also Hurspool v. Ralston, 48 Wash. 6, 290 P.2d 981 (1955); Skodje v. Hardy,
47 Wash. 557, 288 P.2d 471 (1955).2 5 See, e.g., Markue, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Crzv.-MAR. L. REv. 520 (1965); Seidelson,
Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CA-H. U.L. Rxv. 187 (1966);
Morgan v. Rosenburg, 370 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. App. 1963).
26 See, e.g., Graham v. Sisco, 248 Ark. 6, 8, 449 S.W.2d 949, 951 (1970); Agnew v.
Parks, 172 Cal. App. 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959). Even when a plaintiff is able to secure
expert testimony there are many hurdles which his counsel must overcome. The plaintiff
normally is forced to rely upon an expert from another community. This can greatly reduce
the impact of the testimony on the jury. The defendant physician's insurance carrier, on
the other hand, can normally rely upon the testimony of many experts from within the
community. Insurance companies have been known to spend thousands of dollars in fees
for expert local witnesses. The defendant physician will most often win the "battle of
experts." The plaintiff is faced with the financial burden of hiring expert witnesses and
of enduring long and protracted litigation. See Winikoff, supra note 6, at 701, for a very
good discussion of this problem.
2 Malpractice Litigation at 624. See also CoMmissioN REaoar at 31, in which the
legal doctrines are discussed.
Winikoff, supra note 6, states:
The primary motives of the physician in refusing to testify probably have very
little to do with protecting his fellow physicians. In most cases, the offending
physician will be censured, or if the offense is serious enough, he may be forced
to leave the hospital staff or even the community.
Id. at 702.
28 See, e.g., Malpractice Litigation at 632. The major disadvantages of the traditional
trial procedure and the reasons for the adoption of a screening panel are discussed in
Winikoff, supra note 6, at 709. They are: 1) the long delay between the filing of a suit
1975]
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THE COMPOSITION OF THE PANEL
The medical review panel will be comprised of four members."'
Each party to the action will select one physician and the two physicians
will select the third physician panelist. The parties will then appoint
an attorney to serve in an advisory capacity and as chairman. The three
physicians will be entitled to vote. The attorney will serve in a non-
voting capacity.3" The composition of the panel will change with each
claim of malpractice. Plaintiffs will still be left with the dilemma of
finding a physician who will be willing to pass judgment on a fellow
physician; however, since the physician is called upon not to testify
against a fellow physician, but rather to participate in the review of
the evidence and the rendering of an independent judgment, the diffi-
culty in finding a physician may be reduced. The physician will also
have the support of two colleagues in rendering a decision. The method
of selecting the panel is apparently unique to the Indiana plan.3" It
is extremely likely that the plaintiff's attorney will attempt to appoint
those physicians who have in the past given testimony in malpractice
actions. It is also likely that the defendant's insurance carrier will look
to those physicians who have taken an extremely negative position on
the subject of malpractice. While this type of selection process is a
distinct possibility, it will hopefully not become a reality. The success
or failure of the medical review panel depends on its objectivity. The
panel must serve as a completely neutral body willing to make decisions
that may be less than favorable to their medical colleagues.
The panel is to consider all evidence submitted by the respective
parties.3" The evidence will be submitted in written form and may in-
dude reports from physicians, hospital records, photographs, and any
and all other relevant information. The panel has the duty, imposed by
and final disposition, causing long delays in the compensation of valid claims; 2) the diffi-
culty encountered by the patient in obtaining medical experts to help in preparing the case
and testifying in court; 3) the filing of nuisance suits potentially damaging to the physi-
cian's reputation and practice; 4) the high cost to both patient and physician in preparing
a case for trial; 5) the complex nature of most medical malpractice cases and the degree
of specialized education and sophistication necessary to make competent findings of fact
make questionable the ability of a judge or jury to render a competent decision as to
whether there is malpractice.29 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3 (Burns Supp. 1975).
30 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3 (Burns Supp. 1975).
31 See Winikoff, supra note 6, at 713.
32 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-4 (Burns Supp. 1975) provides:
The evidence to be considered by the medical review panel shall be promptly sub-
mitted by the respective parties in written form only. The evidence may consist
of medical charts, X-rays, lab tests, excerpts of treatises, depositions of witnesses




the statute,33 to request all necessary information. The panel is given
the opportunity to consult with medical authorities. In deciding whether
there was malpractice, the panel is not limited to the information and
evidence supplied by the parties, but is required to render its decision
based on all of the evidence that is necessary in order to make a fair and
proper decision. The parties will have the opportunity, upon request,
to question the panel concerning any matters relevant to the issue to
be decided by the panel.3 '
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
INDIANA MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL
The assumption that medical review panels will decrease legal
costs and increase efficiency is premised on the theory that a finding of
malpractice will result in a quick settlement, and that the finding of
no malpractice will result in a dismissal. If a claimant with a meritorious
claim is not satisfied with the defendant's offer of settlement he may
file his claim in the court and the report of the panel may be introduced
as evidence. The party may also, at his own cost, call any member of
the medical review panel as a witness.3" The medical review panel pro-
vides the plaintiff's attorney with an expert witness in all malpractice
cases. The person whose claim has been rejected by the panel may also
proceed to the courts." As impressive as the scheme appears on paper,
the realities of the current medical malpractice situation may greatly
reduce the effectiveness of the medical review panel.
One of the earliest screening panels was created by the Pima County
plan, established in 1957 by physicians and lawyers in Tucson, Ari-
zona.37 The panel consists of nine doctors and nine lawyers. When a
case is presented to the panel, it is reviewed and, if necessary, the panel
consults with medical experts. 8 As in Indiana, a decision is reached as
3 3
1ND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-6 (Burns Supp. 1975) provides:
The panel shall have the right and duty to request all necessary information. The
panel may consult with medical authorities. The panel may examine reports of
such other health care providers necessary to fully inform itself regarding the issue
to be decided.
34 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-5 (Burns Supp. 1975).
35 IND. CODE §16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1975) provides:
Any report of the expert opinion reached by the medical review panel shall be
admissible as evidence in any action subsequently brought by the claimant in a
court of law, but such expert opinion shall not be conclusive and either party shall
have the right to call, at his cost, any member of the medical review panel as a
witness. If called, the witness shall be required to appear and testify.
36The decision of the review panel is not binding upon the parties or the court on
review. See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1975).3 7 See Winikoff, supra note 6, at 706-09; MEDxcAL MALPRAMCncn at 479.
3 8 See MTEDICAL MALPRACICE at 479.
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to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that malpractice was
committed by the doctor and whether such directly caused the patient's
injuries?9 If the answers to both questions are in the affirmative, the
medical society agrees to furnish the necessary medical experts to
testify on behalf of the plaintiff at trial. However, if the answer to either
question is in the negative, then the patient is informed and that party's
attorney agrees not to undertake the case. The only exception would
arise where the attorney was personally satisfied that strong and over-
riding reasons compelled the filing of a lawsuit to protect the interests
of his client. Obviously, the success of such a voluntary plan depends
upon the professional good faith of all concerned. Since the plan was
not imposed by the legislature, it is not binding on physicians or attor-
neys. However, the Pima County plan is so well regarded that it is now
utilized by virtually all members of both the health and medical pro-
fessions in the county.4" The legal profession believes that the physician
panelists have been fair in their appraisal of whether malpractice has
occurred and the medical panelists believe that the lawyers have also
acted fairly.
Other localities that have attempted to adopt the Pima County plan
have faced the problems created by physicians who look upon the plan
as a means of insulating fellow physicians from liability, and by lawyers
who look upon the plan as a means of fabricating a malpractice case
where there is none. In these communities, the plan has failed horribly.
There is one major and important difference between the Pima
County plan and the Indiana Act. The panel in the Pima County plan
is composed of an equal number of attorneys and doctors, all with a
vote. The Indiana Act, by electing not to include voting attorney panel-
ists, has overlooked the fact that malpractice is both a medical and a
legal problem, the existence of which has traditionally been determined
by a trier of fact.2 Physicians are competent to testify as to medical
3 9 See Winikoff, supra note 6, at 706. The Pima plan is reprinted in the Winikoff
article. See also Hamacher, supra note 1, for a discussion of the plan.
40 See generally Hamacher, supra note 1.
41 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at 479.
At the National AMA-ABA Medico-Legal Meeting at Salt Lake City, Utah, in
1959, a doctor from Seattle, Washington, told the audience that the Seattle Medical
Society had tried such a plan [i.e., the Pima plan], but had given up in disgust
after a two year bitter experience of finding that the plan was a "one-way street"
in favor of the patient only, because the patients and their attorneys were never
deterred from suing by an adverse finding of the panel.
Id.
42 One major problem is whether the panel is to serve as the ultimate trier of fact, or
merely as a screening mechanism to determine whether there may have been malpractice.
The Pima plan provides that the medico-legal panel should determine whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the acts complained of constitute professional negligence. The
[Vol. 51:103
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standards of care and certain procedural questions. However, failure
to exercise the requisite care is a legal and not a medical question. What
guidelines are to be imposed upon the panelists in deciding whether there
has been malpractice ?"' Attorney panelists would give the medical panel-
ists a view of the malpractice problem that is foreign to most physicians.
Likewise, the medical panelists could, in many cases, inform the legal
community that what appears to be negligence is simply a calculated risk
that was understood by the doctor and explained to the patient.
A variation of the Pima County plan, which is akin to the Indiana
Act, is the plan adopted in New Mexico. That plan has been sanctioned
by both the state medical society and the state bar. The New Mexico
panel consists of three doctors and three attorneys. Prior to submission
to the panel, the patient agrees not to sue if the panel finds against
him, unless there are overriding reasons to sue.
Cooperation between lawyers and doctors has made the panel
procedure extremely successful. If the plaintiff prevails before the
panel, an expert is selected by the medical association for the plaintiff."
However, this expert is not a member of the panel and has had no prior
connection with the case.4" In Indiana, on the other hand, each physician-
panelist knows that he or she may be called upon to testify in court for
or against a colleague. This may cause the panelists to search for a
standard of care that is so low that no physician could be found negligent.
It may cause a panelist to look only for the most blatant instances of
negligence and to overlook other cases which have merit and which
should be submitted to a jury. In New Mexico, however, the panelists
are never called upon to testify in court and their deliberations are not
part of the public record. The rationale behind the Indiana procedure
is that a panelist who knows that future testimony may be necessary
will be more apt to render a decision which is fair and supported by
the evidence. Every physician knows that the plaintiff, absent his
Indiana Act, however, requires the medical panel to find that the evidence supports the
conclusion that the defendant failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as
charged in the complaint.
43 The question of standard of care is extremely complex. One writer has noted that
the medical profession is unique in that, because of the requirement for expert witnesses,
the medical profession has set its own standard of conduct. A few recent cases have shown
a willingness on the part of the courts to require more of a doctor than mere compliance
with the customary standard, by considering the customary practice as only one factor
among others in the determination of negligence. Commentary, Physicians and Surgeons-
Standard of Care-Medical Specialist May Be Found Negligent as a Matter of Law De-
spite Compliance With the Customary Practice of the Speciality, 28 VAND. L. REv. 441-46




assistance, will have a very difficult time in obtaining expert testimony.
Ultimately, the panel may be protected by the very conspiracy of silence
which it was created to overcome. Again, the inclusion of attorneys as
voting panelists might militate against this occurrence.
One of the major issues facing any medical review panel is the
quantum of evidence necessary for a finding of malpractice. The
Indiana Act does not establish the quantum of evidence necessary for
such a finding.46 The cases which will undoubtedly cause the panel
the most difficulty are those in which there is conflicting evidence. In
these cases, it is absolutely necessary that there be attorney panelists.
The differing value systems of lawyers and doctors will cause a medical
review panel composed solely of physicians to set an excessively high
standard for a finding of malpractice. There is a natural disparity be-
tween the professional values of doctors and lawyers. One noted work
views the differences in the professional education of doctors and
lawyers as the cause of this disparity.47
The modem law curriculum is essentially a continuing socratic dia-
logue. Medical instruction is largely didactic and authoritative. Per-
haps the reasons for this largely inhere in the nature of the medical
education, although one may question whether its techniques are ex-
cessively dogmatic. A controversial method is meat of the lawyer not
only because he has been nurtured in controversy from his first day
in law school. The physician on the other hand has been conditioned
to objective scientific inquiry and to him notorious contest with its
emotional overtones, is apt to be a disruptive element in the search
for facts. While the lawyer typically sees challenge in open disputa-
tion, the physician may see it only as unnecessary insult, especially
46 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-7 (Burns Supp. 1975) provides:
The panel shall have the sole duty to express its expert opinion as to whether or
not the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or defendants acted
or failed to act within the appropriate standards of care as charged in the com-
plaint. After reviewing all evidence and after any examination of the panel by
counsel representing either party, the panel shall, within thirty [301 days, render
one or more of the following expert opinions which shall be in writing and signed
by the panelists:
(a) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or defendants
failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the
complaint.
(b) The evidence does not support the conclusion that the defendant or de-
fendants failed to meet the applicable standard of care as charged in the
complaint.
(c) That there is a material issue of fact, not requiring expert opinion, bear-
ing on liability for the consideration by the court or jury.
(d) The conduct complained of was or was not a factor of the resultant dam-
ages. If so, whether the plaintiff suffered:
(1) any disability and the extent and duration of the disability, and
(2) any permanent impairment and the percentage of the impairment.
47 See LOUISEL, & WiILTIAMS f 1.03.
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when his own or a brother physician's treatment of a patient is called
into question."8
In order for a proper standard to be articulated, attorney panelists
must be included, and the continuity of the panel must be assured.
Both of these elements are absent from the Indiana legislation. The
quantum of evidence required must be understood by all panelists and
must be administered uniformly. The attorney member of the medical
review panel in Indiana is to be chosen by the parties. If the parties
cannot agree on an attorney, he is to be chosen from the roll of attorneys
in the state. This procedure may well result in the selection of an attorney
with no expertise in malpractice litigation to advise the physician mem-
bers on malpractice. Furthermore, since the panel will change with each
claim, there is no continuity of membership. One panel may view the
evidence from .the standpoint of what a jury would do given the evi-
dence; another may view the evidence from the standpoint of whether
or not there is sufficient evidence to present the case to a jury. Experience
dictates that the success or failure of medical review panels depends
on the cooperation between physicians and attorneys.4 9 The plaintiff's
attorney must be satisfied that the decision of the panel is based upon
an objective inquiry applying the proper standards. The absence of
attorney panelists or of experts in malpractice litigation as advisors
reduces the possibility of an effective medical review panel. The panel
should be a medical-legal panel.
The review panel could also be the first step in improving medical-
legal relations. If the panel system is to have any efficacy, state bar
and medical associations should now begin to educate their members
concerning the legal and medical aspects of malpractice. The medical
profession should be instructed on the law of malpractice and on the
lawyer's duties to his client. The legal profession should reach a better
understanding of the physician's job and problems."0 The plaintiffs'
bar should insure the medical profession that the only cases which will
be presented to the review panel are those cases in which the plaintiff's
attorney believes there is a possibility of malpractice. Likewise, the
48 Id.
49 See Winikoff, supra note 6, at 700. Insurance companies also play a dominant role
in the success or failure of a panel. In many communities the insurance companies have
adopted a posture adverse to screening panels. Carriers are afraid that the panels will in-
crease the claimants' possibility of success. Even in those states in which panels have re-
duced litigation cost, the premiums charged practitioners have not decreased because in-
surers group states on a regional basis. Id. at 716-17.
50 See generally LouisuL & WLLIAmmS at 14-67 9 2.01-2.30 where the authors devote
one full chapter to understanding the doctor and medical science.
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medical profession should insure the public that redress will be pro-
vided for professional negligence.
LIMITATION OF RECOVERY: AN UNNECESSARY
ADDITION TO THE ACT
One problem facing the seriously injured victim of malpractice is
that henceforth there will be a limitation on the amount of recovery.
The Indiana Act imposes a $500,000 damage limitation for persons
who are victims of malpractice. The first $100,000 is to be guaranteed
by insurance of the health care provider. The balance, up to the ceiling,
is to be paid by the statutorily-created patient's compensation fund.'
In opting to include the limitation of recovery for any injury or death,
the legislature may have done irreparable damage to the public interest
by precluding the seriously injured victim from obtaining a satisfactory
award.
An assumption underlying all proposals for limitation of recovery
is that jury awards in malpractice cases are excessive. 2 There is little
evidence to support this assumption." Recently gathered statistics show
that only a very small percentage of malpractice actions result in verdicts
in excess of $100,000." 4 However, there are those cases in which the
injury is so catastrophic that the limitation imposed by the Act will be
patently unfair to the injured victim.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Iowa decided the case of Schelby
v. Baker.5 The trial judge, sitting without a jury, awarded damages
in the amount of $912,000.56 The malpractice consisted of a series of
gross medical blunders resulting in permanent brain damage to an
infant. An economist testified as to the economic impact of the injury.
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the damages awarded were reason-
able and hinted very strongly in their opinion that higher damages could
61 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (Bums Supp. 1975) provides:
(a) The total amount recoverable for any injury or death of a patient may not
exceed five hundred thousand dollars [$500,000).
(b) A health care provider qualified under this article [16-9.5-1-1-16-9.5-9-1o]
is not liable for an amount in excess of one hundred thousand [$100,000] for
a claim of malpractice.
(c) Any amount due from a judgment or settlement which is in excess of the total
liability of all liable health care providers, subject to subsections (a) and (b),
shall be paid from the patients' compensation fund pursuant to provisions of
section 3 [16-9.5-4-3], chapter 4. [IC 1471, 16-9.5-2-2, as added by Acts
1975, P.L. 146, § 1, p-.
52 See CominssioN REPORT at 18.5
3 Id. at 10.
5 4 Id. at 11.
" Iowa - , 217 N.W.2d 708 (1974).
56 Id. at - , 217 N.W.2d at 717.
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have been awarded.5 The limitation of recovery in Indiana would have
prevented adequate compensation in such a case. Such catastrophes are
rare, but when they occur recovery should not be barred by legislative
whim.
The present system provides protection against any potentially
excessive jury award. Where the issue on appeal is excessive damages,
the appellate standard of review is whether the damages are so excessive
and unjust that the court or jury must have been influenced by passion
or prejudice."5 In discussing this review of damages, known as remittitur,
the Indiana Court of Appeals has stated that there are only general
guidelines for compensating the malpractice victim and each case must
be individually studied to determine adequate compensation. Remittitur
has been applied in a number of personal injury cases involving mal-
practice.59 No other liability system based on fault limits recovery so
absolutely. The limitation of recovery by the patient in the Indiana Act
is unjust and unfounded and should be abandoned.
The Act also includes a limitation of liability for the health care
provider. If this limitation causes a reduction of professional liability
insurance premiums for the competent health care provider, that is all
to the good. However, the patient turned plaintiff must be guaranteed
that there is a fund from which compensation will be paid in the event
of an injury caused by professional negligence. Whether this fund is
exclusively provided by the insurance industry or partially by a state
insurance pool is of no import so long as the injured victim is fully
and completely compensated.
The Indiana Act includes a mechanism for the reporting and re-
view of all claims against health care providers.6 The Board of Pro-
fessional Registration and Examination for the particular health care
provider will determine whether the health care provider is fit to
practice his profession. There have been numerous complaints that the
medical profession will not police itself and that the only policing
mechanism is the courts. Here the Act provides an innovative solution.
STATUTE OF LImITATIONS
A special malpractice statute of limitations has been in effect in
5 7 Id. at -, 217 N.W.2d at 725.
s Carpenter v. Campbell, 149 Ind. App. 189, 197, 271 N.E.2d 163, 169 (1971) (mal-
practice action).
59 See, e.g., Christy v. Salitermann, - Minn. -, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970); Lake v.
St. Francis Cardiac Hosp., 28 App. Div. 2d 895, 282 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1967); Larrimore v.
Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n., 54 Del. 449, 181 A.2d 573 (1962).
" IND. CODE § 16-9.5-6-1-2 (Bums Supp. 1975).
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Indiana since 1941.61 Under both the new Malpractice Act and the
former special malpractice statute of limitations there is a two year
limitation from the date of the act, omission or neglect.
62
Courts, attempting to avoid the inequities caused by the strict
application of the two year statute, have refused to apply the statute
literally.63 Indiana recognizes the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.64
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting the Indiana
statute, held that the statute does not commence to run until there
is knowledge of the act causing the damage, or until termination of the
doctor and patient relationship.65 The exceptions to the two year statute
are judge-made. The court is required to determine whether or not
the equities dictate a less than literal reading of the statute.
Recently, the Indiana Supreme Court decided the case of Chaffin
v. Nicosia.66 The issue before the court was the constitutionality of
the prior malpractice statute of limitations, which is substantially the
same as the statute of limitations provided by the Act. The major
difference is that the new Act significantly changes the law as it applies
to claims of minors. Before the passage of the Act, Indiana allowed a
minor to bring a medical malpractice action within two years of reaching
majority. The new act gives a minor under the age of six only until
the age of eight to bring a claim. All other minors are to bring claims
within the two year limitation period. 7 The supreme court in Chaffin
was asked to decide whether the two year statute of limitations for
medical malpractice was an exception to the statute allowing minors
to sue within two years after reaching majority. The court held that
there were no conflicts between the medical malpractice statute of
limitations and the statute concerning legal disability:
61 IND. CODE § 34-4-19-1 (Bums 1971).
62 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1975) provides:
No claim, whether in contract or in tort, may be brought against a health care
provider based upon professional services or health care rendered or which should
have been rendered unless filed within two [21 years from the date of the alleged
act, omission or neglect except that a minor under the full age of six [6] years
shall have until his eighth birthday in which to file. This section applies to all
persons regardless of minority or other legal disability.
63 Doctrines such as "the continuous treatment rule," and "fraudulent concealment"
have developed. See Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York's Civil
Practice Laws and Rules, 14 SYRAcusE L. REV. 42 (1962); Note, Medical Malpractice: A
Survey of Statutes of Limitations, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 597 (1969).
Some courts have refused to apply any doctrine which would alleviate the hardship
of the statute. See, e.g., Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Maine 228, 182 A.2d 660 (1962).
64 Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d 891 (1956).
65 Ostojic v. Buckman, 405 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1968).
66 Ind. -, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974).
67 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1975).
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To construe the medical malpractice statute as a legislative bar on all
malpractice actions under all circumstances unless commenced within
two years from the act complained of (discoverable or otherwise)
would raise substantial questions under the Article I, § 12 guarantee
of open courts and redress for injury to every man, not to mention
the offense to lay concepts of justice.68
The Indiana legislature chose to ignore this rather strong language.
The court also opined that the two year statute for a minor could cause
some extraordinarily harsh results which would be inconsistent with
the statute relating to legal disability, which was designed for the
protection of minors.69 While the medical community and the insurance
industry would certainly prefer a short statute of limitations in order
to improve the ability of the ratemaker to predict the potential claims
within a time period, and to decrease the period of vulnerability for the
physician, the shortening of the statute and the elimination of a legal
remedy should not be at the expense of the public.7 The innocently
ignorant malpractice victim should not be denied judicial relief. If
the medical review panel adheres strictly to the language of the statute
of limitations contained in the Act, the Indiana Supreme Court will
probably remedy the situation by reading into the Act those exceptions
which will protect the seriously injured victim.
The Oregon State Bar has issued a position paper in response to a
bill proposed in that state which would impose a two year limit on
the time a doctor can be sued for medical negligence regardless of
when the injury is discovered."1 Under the present law in Oregon a
patient must sue within two years from the time the injury is dis-
covered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been dis-
covered, provided that such action must be commenced within five years
of the date of the treatment, omission, or operation upon which the
action is based.72 The Oregon State Bar, in opposing a two year statute
of limitations, used the example of a person who discovers he has
leukemia, only later finding out that the leukemia was caused by an
excessive dosage of radiation administered more than two years ago.73
The proposed statute in Oregon, and the statute promulgated in Indiana,
if strictly interpreted, would leave this person without a remedy.
6 8 Ind. at -, 310 N.E.2d at 870.
6 9 ld. at -, 310 N.E.2d at 871.
70The doctrines of fraudulent concealment, and the discovery rule, as well as the
minor's diability, lengthen the two year period. The ratemaker (the insurance carrier)
allegedly cannot plan with the certainty that could be achieved with a strict two year
statute.
71 ATLA at 890.
72 ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.110(4) (1971).
73 ATLA at 891.
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LIMITATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
The contingency fee has been the subject of much controversy in
the malpractice area. Under the Indiana Act there is no regulation
of the contingency fee for any recovery below the $100,000 limit.
7 4
Statistically, less than one percent of all the cases surveyed by the HEW
Commission resulted in awards in excess of $100,000. 7' The Com-
mission noted that the occasional large verdict or settlement has tended
to give the impression that most malpractice cases are settled for large
amounts and that the attorney fees are correspondingly great.7 '6 The
Commission found that by reducing the average plaintiff's lawyer's
contingent fee to an hourly basis for purposes of comparison, there was
no gross discrepancy between the average rates charged by the plaintiffs'
bar and defense bar in malpractice cases.7 The limitation of the con-
tingency fee from the patients' compensation fund, to a maximum 15
percent," cannot be justified on the theory that such a limitation will
reduce the amount of monies to be expended by the fund since the
contingency fee makes no difference in the amount of judgment. The
fee is not part of the evidence of damage.
Although the total amount of the award which will go directly
to the plaintiff is increased by such fee regulations, it should be borne
in mind that the amount of the award is often commensurate with the
skill of the attorney. The cases involving catastrophic injury involve
a commitment of time and energy far greater than in most cases. Cases
of the catastrophic sort often are far more expensive and present legal
and factual issues which can only be handled by the experienced trial
lawyer. If, as the HEW Commission found, the malpractice contingency
fee is not excessive, then it is difficult to see why attorneys' fees should
be limited solely in the context of the malpractice action.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's attorney, the present court system, and the con-
tingency fee are neither the primary, nor even the secondary, causes
of the malpractice "crisis.'7 9 They are, at best, symptomatic of the
underlying problem. All of the symptoms should be considered in diag-
74 See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-S-1 (Bums Supp. 1975).
75 ComassioN REPORT at 33.
76 Id. at 33-34.
77 Id. at 33.
78 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1975).
79 Bernzweig, The Malpractice Problem: The Need for a Perspective, statement to a
meeting convened by the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare to discuss the mal-
practice crisis, reprinted in ATLA at 60.
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nosing the disease and in prescribing the cure. Unfortunately, in the
current strife between the medical and legal professions, one party has
been too frequently overlooked: the injured patient.8" Legislation ad-
dressing the malpractice crisis must be carefully scrutinized with the
interest of the patient in mind. A facile and expeditious solution may
deprive an injured party of the right to seek redress and adequate
compensation.
80 Page, Why Patients Lose Their Patience, The Wall St. Journal, April 14, 1975, at 14.
